Why did the coup in Cameroon fail?
By Ben Mensah
What makes the Camerounian episode different from what other West African countries have experienced? Was it in the stars of the Camerounian soldiers to fail? Were the other soldiers who resisted the attempt more loyal to President Biya than the soldiers in the other countries to their Presidents? Were Cameroon's loyal soldiers more brave than their counterparts in Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina, etc?The echoes of shock, anger on the part of pro-coup elements and relief for anti-coup elements over the failure of the April attempt at toppling the regime of President Paul Biya of Cameroon have virtually died away.
Out of 1,053 people arrested in connection with the attempt, 617 were freed by a Yaounde military tribunal. 436 went on trial, 46 were sentenced to death, two were jailed for life, 183 received prison sentences ranging from 2-20 years while the rest were acquitted and discharged.
April 6, the day of the coup attempt has been labelled a Black Friday and has notched a conspicuous position in the history of the country. President Biya who was described as "weak, silly and hypocrite" by the man generally believed to be the brain behind the coup attempt, Ex-President Ahidjo, has emerged out of the destabilisation attempt as the undisputed leader pursuing a policy dubbed "New Deal for all Camerounians."
The attempt of a failed coup has also drawn scathing condemnation of Colonel Ibrahim Saleh, Captain Awal Abassi and the other plotters by journalists and other watchers of events in that part of the African continent.
But there is no doubt that if the coup had succeeded these same commentators would have found it appropriate to hail the new leaders who prior to the success of the coup were conspirators. They would instantaneously have merited all the reverence that is usually heaped on military leaders like Rawlings of Ghana, Nigeria's Buhari, Liberia's Doe, Sankara of Burkina, Kerekou of Benin, Kountche of Niger, Togo's Eyadema, all of whom have turned the greater part of West Africa into a military zone.
But the fact that the Camerounian soldiers who attempted to overthrow President Biya were not as lucky as the others mentioned above raises a very crucial question as to why the coup attempt failed in the Cameroon.
A booklet recently published by a Camerounian journalist Jerome F. Gwellem chronicling the various stages of the coup attempt reports that the coup makers initially achieved their targets with ease.
On page 55 of the publication, the four targets of the soldiers were listed as the Presidential palace, Army Headquarters, residence of the chief of staff of the Armed Forces and Radio Yaounde. On the following page the publication pointed out, 'Radio Yaounde police guards on duty were easily overpowered and the radio captured. The residence of the Minister of Armed Forces was attacked but he had sneaked out and set up a secret command post from where he contacted loyal units to counter attack the rebels before telephone lines were cut'.
The failure of the coup attempt has very useful lessons for other West African countries who are struggling hopelessly to keep their soldiers in the barracks and not in the seats of government.
Two facts that emerge from above are that the Republican Guards who were created to protect the President and were always known to be the best equipped, succeeded in taking over Radio Yaounde and cutting telephone services. In addition they occupied the Presidential palace and seized the airport.
In an area where military coups have been successfully staged by an insignificant number of soldiers who were less equipped, the powerful Republican Guards did more than enough to ensure the success of their plans. Yet they failed!
What therefore makes the Camerounian episode different from what the other West African countries have experienced? Was it in the stars of the Camerounian soldiers to fail? Were the other soldiers who resisted the attempt more loyal to President Biya than the soldiers in the other countries to their Presidents? Were Cameroon's loyal soldiers more brave than their counterparts in Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina etc?
In finding answers to these questions one needs to read Gwellem's book titled, "Paul Biya - Hero of the New Deal." On page 57 he wrote "radio journalists and technicians, by deliberately limiting rebel announcements to Yaounde vicinity only, accomplished a major feat that deserves commendation.
"Had it been otherwise, the task of loyal forces would have been made rather difficult during the counter attack.
In fact, loyal units from the provinces could have been demoralised if news of the mutiny was broadcast countrywide. Issa Adoum, General Manager of the National Fund for Rural Development (FONADER), who was, at least, a "Mr President" of the rebels for a few hours, didn't know that his speech to the ten provinces of Cameroon was being heard only in Yaounde."
For any coup d'etat to succeed the radio must inform the people that a new government has taken over and the old one either dismissed or under arrest. This has been the pattern set elsewhere, especially in Africa. But the staff of Radio Cameroon Yaounde, played the role of the lamb... intelligently and prudently."
"Broadcast time starts at 5.30 a.m. and the rebels stormed the Radio House as early as 3.30 a.m. There was heavy rain in Yaounde that night. The journalists on arrival were forced by the rebels to lie flat on the wet grass outside until 8 a.m. when they were bundled into the studios and forced to operate their machines.
The rebels didn't know how to run the tape of military music supplied by Lt. Zebobe Elie. Having been assisted, the rebels then asked the radio staff to sit upright on the floor until 10 a.m. Was their rebellion succeeding at this time? The rebels wanted to know international opinion on the coup and marched journalists to the telex room which receives teletyped reports worldwide from some news agencies like Reuter, The Associated Press (AP) Agence France Press (AFP), United Press International (UPI) etc.
How was this reaction related? Mr Gwellem continued: "The situation in Cameroon is confusing.
There are conflicting reports as to who is actually in power since the attempt to overthrow President Biya was reported this morning." This report by AFP the limits of Yaounde." angered the rebels and they had to speedily reassure the world that they were in control and that there was no confusion.
"Taking along with them a journalist and a technician, the rebels jumped into a Peugeot car and sped to Njon-Melen to record a message from their new 'Strong man' Issa Adoum.
"The radio spokesman, Captain Abale, hurriedly read the statement on the radio but its quality of recording and broadcast was very poor. They were mad with anger and severely kicked and insulted the radio staff..
"Unfortunately they had forgotten that the radio house alone does not function in isolation from the transmitters. Technicians at the transmitting station ensured that the two broadcasts of the rebel address were never heard outside Yaounde..
... A few buttons touched did the trick." A comment in 'Africasia' of May 1984, incorporated in Gwellem's book declares: "Special tribute should be given to the radio technicians and journalists who, on their own initiative, cut the international communications lines, so that the massage of the rebellion was inaudible outside
It is obvious from this narration that before a task force set up by the Armed Forces Minister began to counter attack and succeeded in liberating Gen Semengue, Chief of Staff who was held hostage by the rebels, recaptured the Broadcasting House, Airport and Presidential palace, the coup attempt had been frustrated by ordinary Camerounians who though not armed were determined to apply their professional skill to prevent a coup d'etat.
And whether they did it in defence of President Biya's policies of whatever interpretation can be put on the action of the Camerounian journalists and radio technicians in the early hours of April 6, the failure of the coup attempt has very useful lessons for other West African countries who are struggling hopelessly to keep their soldiers in the barracks and not in the seats of government.
Mr Gwellem's book is available. from Gwellem publications, Box 408, Limbe, Cameroon.
