Did Rawlings betray the Left or did the Left betray Rawlings?
On February 25, 1985, a Correspondent published an article "Did Rawlings betray the Left or did the Left betray Rawlings?" in which he contrasted Dr Botchwey's former stance on IMF- World Bank against his present defence of the institutions. We reproduce part of the article below so that it may be read alongside what Dr Botchwey said at his recent press conference.
How did Dr Botchwey, once an acerbic critic of the IMF/World Bank come to his conversion? To get a glimpse of what he has actually written regarding this issue, I shall quote extensively from a paper he wrote for the United Nations University entitled "TRANSFORMING THE "PERIPHERY": A STUDY OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOCIAL FORCES IN GHANA FOR DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY', published in 1981, shortly before the December 31, 1981 coup. In chapter III of the 28-page paper entitled 'MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE RISE OF THE OPPOSITION', Dr Botchwey wrote:
"It is important to stress that, in spite of its limitations, the Nkrumah regime at least recognized the need to radically transform the existing relations of production. By 1966 the government had begun to be more assertive of the nation's sovereignty in its relations with foreign capital. Its refusal to sacrifice the national interest in its relations with foreign capital and its revolutionary posture in regional and continental African politics were a source of great worry to business and financial interests, particularly in Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. Indeed, the outpourings of relief from private and official Western sources following the coup underscored the extent of this worry.
"But, in sharp contrast to the revolu- tionary orientation of the Nkrumah regime, the post-1966 governments tended to accommodate and perpetuate the relations of dependence that history had shown to be such fetters to the development of productive forces..
"The new military dictatorship - the National Liberation Council (NLC) - moved with almost indecent haste, on the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to reverse Nkrumah's policies and thus put the interest of imperialism on securer ground. By 1965 KANO the total foreign debt stood at US$569 million. Of this, US$491 million was in medium- and short-term credits, 81 percent of them owed to Western sources. Indeed, the 1966 coup came shortly after Nkrumah's refusal to accept the IMF's conditions for servicing these debts and obtaining fresh credits. The new regime not only accepted these conditions; it boldly removed the facade of national sovereignty and virtually left the country's Western creditors in charge of the country's economic policy.
"In return for the capitulation, the IMF offered £20 million in stand-by all West African ports. credit; and, within a month of the coup d'etat, food aid, which had been withheld previously, reached Ghana's shores from the United States under its PL 480 programme. West Germany even sent spectacles (!) for the victims of Nkrumah's detention laws and, within months of the coup, also signed a 20-year loan agreement with the new regime.
There was no mistaking the alliance of class forces at work at this time.."
And what did the Progress Party of Dr K.A. Busia do after it had taken over power from the NLC? Dr Botchwey concludes the chapter thus:
"Meanwhile, Dr Busia, the Prime Minister, continued to negotiate with the British, to whom the bulk of the medium- and short-term loans were owed. He requested a US$360 million long-term loan to pay off outstanding loans and build foreign reserves by US$100 million. The British refused any help unless Ghana accepted the IMF's comprehensive programme "stabilization".
The government once again succumbed, and in December 1971 another devaluation of the country's currency was announced, together with the cuts in budgetary expenditure. Although minimum wage was raised simultaneously, this was a merely cosmetic measure since it was anticipated that the increase would be more than wiped out by the increase in the cost of living that would follow the devaluation. Indeed, within three days of the devaluation, prices of consumer goods rose sharply and hoarding by petty traders began in earnest."
What did Dr Botchwey think of the June 4, 1979 uprising? Again his own words:
"It came as no surprise, therefore, when on June 4, 1979, the men and junior officers of the armed forces toppled the government in a bloody mutiny and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to run the country pending democratic elections.
"The leadership of the Junior officers and the non-officer corps gave this military intervention an entirely different character. Indeed, the next three months were to be the darkest days in the lives of the comprador forces in the society. The Revolutionary Council showed its wrath first by executing in a rather capricious and cynical fashion a number of senior officers, including three former heads of state, and then, equally summarily, dismissed senior public servants and seized property and assets of leading comprador elements. These measures were highly popular with the working classes - the young Air Force officer who led the mutiny became an instant legend - in spite of evidence that some of these actions were motivated by considerations of personal vengeance and instigated by rival comprador elements..."
Undoubtedly, the above brilliant analysis is typical of the lecture-room Marxist Little did Dr Botchwey know that one day he would be faced with 'realities', forced to make a volte-face, and to defend himself in the following manner:
"The real question is what should a Marxist do faced with the real situation in Ghana, the monetary, and fiscal situation, the condition of the various sectors of the economy, the objective of feeding the people, not from the point of view of any ideal conditions existing in one's head, but the real conditions on the ground?
"I think the concern that is expressed by these (my emphasis) Leftist elements comes from a very fundamental misunderstanding of Marxism, which I understand to be a guide to scientific practice. The matter is not helped any by dogmatic positions or ideal solutions that ignore or run away from the real situation on the ground..."
